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Abstract
We show that the expansion of financial sector may hurt innovative activities and hence
the innovation-led growth, using data on 50 countries over the 1990-2016 period. Countries
with higher level of financial development are found to have a smaller positive or insignificant
effect on innovation. The marginal effect of innovation on growth is a decreasing function of
financial development. Using a dynamic panel threshold method we re-examine the possible
non-linearity between finance, innovation and growth. We find that innovation exhibits an
insignificant effect on output growth when credit to the private sector exceeds a threshold
level of about 60% as a share of GDP. These results are not driven by banking crises, the
long run effect of 2007-2008 financial crisis, or the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis.
Keywords: Financial development; Innovation; Growth; Threshold effect
JEL Classification: G15; O31; O40
1 Introduction
The basic Schumpeterian model of economic growth considers technological progress as an impor-
tant factor for long-run growth (Schumpeter (1934)). The positive role of innovation on growth
has been discussed and tested by a number of subsequent works (Scherer et al. (1986), Freeman
et al. (1994)). Among determinants of innovation, R&D expenditure, talents, technology transfer
and networking have been identified as important factors that shape and promote innovation and
hence the innovation-led growth (Love and Roper (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2016)). Recent years
∗Corresponding author; Affiliation: University of Bath, UK; email: s.asimakopoulos@bath.ac.uk
†Affiliation: Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, USA; email: jb.kim@okstate.edu
‡Affiliation: Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, USA; email: xiaoyang.zhu@okstate.edu
1
have seen an expansion in financial sector around the world with several implications on innova-
tion and growth. First, financial development may facilitate innovation activities by alleviating
credit constraints on the flow of capital to its most productive projects and hence promote R&D
financing and growth (e.g. King and Levine (1993a,b), Benfratello et al. (2008), Brown et al.
(2009), Amore et al. (2013), Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2013), Hsu et al. (2014) and Levine
et al. (2017)). Second, the expansion of financial sector has raised the concern of “brain drain”
between industries (Boustanifar et al. (2017)). Third, credit expansion shows its dark side on
resource allocation, both on physical and human capital (Tobin (1984), Cecchetti et al. (2015)
and Borio et al. (2016)). Collectively, these competing theories and evidences lead to the following
questions: What is the overall effect of financial development on innovation? Will the monotonic
relationship between finance and innovation hold as financial sector continues to expand? How
does financial development affect innovation-led growth?
This paper attempts to answer these questions empirically. Previous studies on the finance-
innovation-growth nexus support the existence of a positive monotonic relationship. However,
we explore whether there exists a non-monotonic relationship with a possible threshold effect.
Specifically, our study is conducted in two parts. First, we examine the nonlinear relationship
between financial development and innovation. Second, we study the role of financial develop-
ment on the innovation-growth relationship. To this end, we use two different methods to explore
the possible nonlinearities. Initially we qualitatively split the sample into different subgroups by
the level of financial development and income and apply a system-GMM to estimate the effect of
financial development on innovation for each group. The system-GMM methodology allows us to
use the lagged value of dependent and independent variables to account for potential endogeneity
issues. However, this method may not give precise estimation on the threshold value at which
the effect changes, if any. For this reason, we also employ a novel GMM model developed by Seo
and Shin (2016). This model extends the Hansen (1999) and Caner and Hansen (2004) static
panel threshold model and the Kremer et al. (2013) dynamic panel threshold model by allowing
for the transitional variable and other covariates to be endogenous. The Seo and Shin (2016)’s
method requires the use of balanced panel with large n and small T . We curtail the data to fit
the model using five years non-overlapping average data, which is also consistent with the related
growth literature (see for example Asimakopoulos and Karavias (2016) and references therein). To
guarantee that our data contains roughly equal proportion of developing and developed countries,
we consider only the financial development in credit market. Thus, we end up with a balanced
panel of 50 countries from 1990 to 2016, including 22 developing and 28 developed countries.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we find that the overall effect of financial
development on innovation is positive. However, this effect is lower when financial development
exceeds a certain level. Second, the overall effect of innovation on growth is positive and het-
erogeneous across the various levels of financial development. Third, the dynamic panel thresh-
old method shows the existence of non-linear relationship between innovation and growth with
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a threshold value around 60% of GDP. Our threshold value reflects the difference between the
threshold model used in our paper, dealing with monotonicity and endogeneity simultaneously
compared to previous studies, as well as the impact of global financial integration. Financial inte-
gration may enhance the positive effect of financial development on innovation and growth leading
to a smaller threshold value of financial development.
Credit expansion may lead to banking crisis or economic crisis and the innovation activities
may be dampened during the crisis (Döner (2017), OECD (2012), Comin and Gertler (2006)
and Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2008)). Therefore, the observed vanishing effect may be caused by
banking crisis. To check whether the threshold effects are affected by crisis, we interact the crisis
dummy with the variable of interest and estimate the difference in the effect between crisis and
tranquil period. Our findings indicate an insignificant negative effect on the interaction term.
The 2007-2008 financial crisis may have a long run negative effect on innovation. In our sample,
39.2% of the high income countries’ innovation never recover to their pre-crisis level and 22.7%
of middle income countries’ innovation sink after the financial crisis. The subsequent European
sovereign debt crisis continually depresses the innovative activities for many countries in Euro
Zone (EZ) and probably countries outside the EZ since 2010. We find that 67.86% of high income
countries experienced a reduction in innovation after 2010 and 50% of middle income countries
have seen a sluggish recovery in innovation. The situation does not get ameliorated even for coun-
tries with high quality of governance. During the same period, however, we find that the level of
credit is higher in high income countries and in countries with high governance quality. The doc-
umented non-linearity using full sample may be contaminated by the ongoing European sovereign
debt crisis and the long run negative effect of the recent financial crisis. Using a sub-sample from
1990 to 2009, we find a robust non-linearity between finance, innovation, and growth.
Our paper relates and contributes to several strands of theory relating growth, innovation
and financial-market development. Our findings provide consistent results with several theoretical
predictions and recent empirical studies. Regarding the finance-innovation nexus, Tobin (1984)
mentioned that too many financial activities may misallocate resources, both physical and human
capital, from production sector to less productive financial sector. Cecchetti et al. (2015) and Bo-
rio et al. (2016) elaborate this idea by showing that less productive but more pledgeable projects
are easily financed during financial sector expansions. When credit inflates, workers, especially the
talented STEM workers, are lured into low productivity gains sectors due to high finance compen-
sation (Axelson and Bond (2015), Boustanifar et al. (2017) and Célérier and Vallée (2018)). Both
channels hurt real sector by reducing the innovation capacity. Weinstein and Yafeh (1998), using
firm level data, show that close firm-bank ties may facilitate firms to access credit, but it may also
prevent firms from involving risky and high return projects such as R&D activities. Morales (2003)
introduces financial sector in an endogenous growth model and shows that financial activity may
have two opposite external effects on research productivity. On one hand, the positive effect of
financial activity will spill over to other sectors of the economy and promote productivity. On the
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other hand, this positive externality would induce creative destruction process and discourage the
incentives to invest in R&D. Inspired by the work of Klette and Kortum (2004) and Akcigit and
Kerr (2018), where different types of innovations are introduced in a growth model, Philippe et al.
(2018) argue that the introduction of financial development into these models may result in two
competing effects. First, potentially good innovators may face less financing constraints to enter
the market due to the development of financial market, which in turn is beneficial to aggregate
innovation and growth. Second, less credit constraints may make it easier for less efficient firms
to remain in the market and prevent more efficient innovators from entering the market. This in
turn may be harmful to aggregate innovation and growth. As financial sector continues to expand
in modern economy and credit constraints are alleviated for many firms, it is uncertain whether
the overall effect of financial development on innovation is monotonic or not.
In terms of the finance-growth relationship, our results are consistent with several recent em-
pirical papers showing that “too much finance” may hurt economic growth. Using country- and
industry-level panel data, Arcand et al. (2015) test the non-linearity between private credit and
growth by including both the private credit and its square term into the growth equation, deriving
a threshold point of around 100% of GDP. Private credit tends to promote growth in the lower
regime, while the effect turns negative in the upper regime. In a similar fashion, Cecchetti and
Kharroubi (2012) estimate the threshold to be nearly 100% of GDP. The baseline models used in
these two studies, however, may suffer from endogeneity and multicollinearity issues (see Law and
Singh (2014) for discussions). In an attempt to control for these issues, Law and Singh (2014) use
a panel threshold model proposed by Kremer et al. (2013) to re-estimate the possible threshold
effect of private credit on growth and they obtain a threshold of around 88% of GDP. Using both
a dynamic panel threshold approach and an autoregressive distributed lag ARDL(p,q) model,
Samargandi et al. (2015) establish the non-monotonic effect of financial development and growth
among middle income countries, suggesting a turning point around 91% of GDP. However, most
of these studies do not explicitly or directly explore the sources of non-linearity between financial
development and growth.
The above discussions may generate two implications. First, financial development may have a
diminishing effect on the rate of innovation, such effect transmits to productivity and slows down
aggregate growth. Second, financial development may also make innovations per se less effective
in promoting growth. For an innovation to be effective in promoting productivity and aggregate
growth, necessary complementary inventions and follow-up investment in productive capital is
required. However, as credit market expands, banks may also prevent firms from involving risky
projects such as R&D activities, causing less productive but more pledgeable projects to be easily
financed. The relatively less investment of productive capital may prolong the implementation
and restructuring lags and reduce the contribution of innovation on productivity and economic
growth.
Most related to our work are studies by Law et al. (2018) and Xiao and Zhao (2012). Law et al.
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(2018) document an inverted U-shaped relationship between financial development and innovation
using a panel of 75 countries over 1996-2010. Their analysis is embodied in the context of insti-
tution quality where the effect of finance on innovation depends upon the quality of institutions.
Our study does not consider the context of institution quality because there is high overlapping
between countries with high quality of governance, high income countries and countries with high
level of financial development. Xiao and Zhao (2012) find that credit market development signifi-
cantly enhances firm innovation in countries with lower government ownership of banks, while the
effect turns to insignificant or even negative when government ownership increases.
Our study contributes to the related literature in three ways. First, we provide direct evi-
dences that finance-innovation-growth nexus follows a non-linear relationship as credit expands.
The findings show that the threshold effect between finance and innovation serves as a possible
channel through which too much finance may harm growth. Second, we also find that the effect of
innovation on growth is weakened by too much finance. Finally, this empirical work is conducted
using a novel GMM method developed by Seo and Shin (2016). This model extends the Hansen
(1999) and Caner and Hansen (2004) static panel threshold model and the Kremer et al. (2013)
panel threshold model by allowing for the transitional variable and other covariates to be endoge-
nous. Therefore, this new dynamic panel threshold model accounts for the endogeneity issue that
is ignored by previous studies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 specifies the empirical models and
describes the data. Section 3 presents and discusses the results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Empirical Specifications and Data
2.1 Empirical strategies
The empirical analysis consists of two parts. First, we examine the non-linear relationship between
financial development and innovation. Second, we estimate how financial development affect the
innovation-growth relationship. To this end, we employ two different methods: linear system
GMM and a dynamic panel threshold.
2.1.1 Linear system-GMM
In the linear system-GMM method, we qualitatively split the sample into two groups by the level of
financial development. We initially sort the countries by their level of financial development. Then
we define the top 25 countries as high financial development countries and the bottom 25 countries
as the low financial development countries. This strategy may not give a precise estimation of the
threshold level of financial development, but it enables us to build an intuition about the possible
nonlinearity between finance, innovation and growth. In our sample, high income countries are
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typically associated with high level of financial development. As a robustness check, we also split
the sample into two groups by their level of GDP per capita: high income countries and middle
incomes1. For each of the five groups, we consider the following specification for the innovation
equation:
innovationit = ρinnovationit−1 + αjFDit + βXit + ui + vt + eit (1)
where innovationit and innovationit−1 are the current and lagged indicator of innovation. Xit
denotes the control set including FDI, schooling, population, GDP per capita, and the protection
for intellectual property right. FDit denotes the financial development indicators. ui is the coun-
try fixed effect that absorbs the effect of country level variation, vt captures the time fixed effect,
which controls for possible cross-sectional dependences. eit captures the stochastic error term. j
is an indicator of high and low level of financial development or high and middle income countries.
System-GMM use the lagged dependent variable and regressors to instrument for possible endo-
geneity issues. In our setting, there are two possible causes of endogeneity: the omitted variable
issue and reverse causality between financial development and innovation. First, if innovationit−1
is correlated with eit, then in the first-difference transformed equation, ∆innovationit−1 would
correlate with ∆eit. Second, technology change relating to communication and data processing
have greatly promoted the development of financial services (Frame et al. (2014)). As instruments
we lag our variables twice for the difference equation and once for the level equation. All the
variables used are five years non-overlapping average data.
Next, we consider how financial development affect the innovation-led growth. In a similar
spirit, we split the sample by the level of financial development and GDP per capita. Specifically,
we consider the effect of innovation on growth for the high level financial development countries,
low level financial development countries, high income countries and middle income countries. For
each group we consider the following growth regression:
yit = ρyit−1 + αinnovationit + γZit + ui + τt + eit (2)
where yit and yit−1 represent current and lagged growth rate of GDP per capita, respectively.
innovationit is the same as in the innovation regression. Zit is the control set including government
expenditure (%GDP), trade (%GDP), investment (%GDP), inflation rate (%), Schooling and
initial GDP per capita. ui, τt and eit refer to country fixed effects, time fixed effects, and stochastic
error term, respectively. Notice that our specification is different from conventional regression
specified in growth literatures, where yit usually refers to GDP per capita. In our sample, GDP
per capita is quite persistent and the Harris-Tzavalis test (Harris and Tzavalis (1999)) shows that
1In our sample, there are no low income countries due to the unavailability of data in indicators of financial
development, innovation indicators, and other variables
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GDP per capita is not stationary2. Using growth rate of per capita GDP instead of the level does
not change our interpretation of the coefficient on variables of interest (see also Asimakopoulos
and Karavias (2016)).
As a robustness check, we also consider the interaction between financial development and
innovation. The specification is as follow:
yit = ρyit−1 + αinnovationit + βFDit ∗ innovationit + γZit + ui + τt + eit (3)
The marginal effect of innovation on growth is α̂+β̂∗FDit. According to the theoretical prediction,
higher level of financial development reduces productivity via brain drain or misallocation in
physical capital and the effect of innovation on growth is lower in countries with higher level of
financial development. Therefore, if there exists any “diminishing effect” for the innovation-growth
nexus due to financial development, α is expected to be greater than zero, while β is expected to
be negative.
2.1.2 Dynamic panel threshold model with endogenous threshold variable
Although the linear system-GMM method helps us to build an intuition about the non-linearity,
it gives neither a rigorous test on the linearity nor the estimated threshold value at which the
effect begins to change. For this reason, we examine the above two questions using a novel GMM
method developed by Seo and Shin (2016). This model extends the Hansen (1999) and Caner and
Hansen (2004) static panel threshold model and the Kremer et al. (2013) panel threshold model
by allowing for the transitional variable and other covariates to be endogenous. To estimate the
coefficients, they propose a First Difference GMM (FD-GMM) transformation. This algorithm
relaxes the exogeneity assumption on regressors and threshold variable and guarantee that the
estimators follow a normal distribution asymptotically, which validates the use of Wald test for
standard statistical inference on threshold and other parameters. For the innovation equation, we
extend equation (1) to:
innovationit = ρinnovationit−1 + αLFDitI(FDit ≤ γ) + αHFDitI(FDit > γ) + βXit + ui + τt + eit
(4)
Note that, the financial development is treated as regime dependent variable as well as transitional
variable. I(·) is an indicator of the regime. γ is a hypothetical threshold value. The subscripts L
and H on α refer to lower and upper regime, respectively. The instrument variables include the
exogenous variables, the lagged dependent variable and other covariates.
In a similar spirit we estimate our growth equation using a dynamic panel threshold model. In
2We use H-T test because our sample contains relatively larger panel and smaller time period, Harris-Tzavalis
test best fit sample structure like this.
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particular, we treat financial development as the threshold variable, while innovation is the regime
dependent variable changing according to the estimated threshold of financial development. The
notation used here is similar to the innovation equation (1). Therefore, the growth model presented
in equation (2) becomes:
yit = ρyit−1 + βLinnovationit ∗ I(FDit ≤ γ) + βHinnovationit ∗ I(FDit > γ) + θZit + ui + τt + eit
(5)
For equations (4) and (5), we use the non-linearity test supW = supWn(γ) statistics upon the null
of αL − αH = 0 and βL − βH = 0, where Wn(γ) is the standard Wald statistic for each fixed γ.
2.2 Data and summary statistics
A complete picture of financial development includes the development in both credit and equity
markets. Due to the limitation of stock market data in developing countries plus the fact that
firms financing in developing countries is mainly through internal retained profits and external
credit market, we constraint our study to credit markets. The private credit by banks and other
financial institutions as a share of GDP is preferred in finance-growth literature (Levine et al.
(2000)). As robustness checks, we also consider credit issued to private sector by money deposite
banks (%GDP), demostic credit to private sector (%GDP) and liquidity liability (%GDP). All
the indicators are obtained from World Bank Financial Structure Database.3 The banking crisis
data is obtained from Laeven and Valencia (2013) Systemic Banking Crises Database (1970-2011).
Inspired by Baker et al. (2016), the data of banking crisis are extended to 2016 by searching for
keywords that indicate a banking crisis for each country between 2012 and 2016. The keywords
used include bank run, bank crisis and illiquidity.4
The innovation is measured by patent applications per 100 billion USD obtained from World
Intellectual Property.5 This indicator is measured as total equivalent counts by applicant’s origin.
We use patent application as an indicator of innovation to account for the truncation issue, since
there are typically two to three years grant lags between application and grant year. For example,
the mean years of grant lags for USPTO fluctuates between 26 months and 32 months and the
distribution of grant lags varies across fields of inventions (Squicciarini et al. (2013)). Another
reason is that the application year better captures the actual effective time of innovation (Griliches
3In our sample, New Zealand missed the indicators of financial development between 2012 and 2016 . To fill the
gaps, we use data for Broad Money, Private sector credit, Domestic credit, Exchange rate between New Zealand
Dollar and US Dollar, and Gross Domestic Product from Reserve Bank of New Zealand(https://www.rbnz.govt.
nz/statistics) to construct the missing indicators in World Bank Financial Structure Database. In New Zealand,
the private credit by deposit banks and Private credit by banks and other financial institution are identical.
4Using this method, we detected several banking crisis for the following countries: China in 2014; Greece in
2015; Portugal in 2014; Spain between 2012 and 2014
5We also consider using patent applications per million population as indicator of innovation, the correlation
between these two indicators is 0.9554 and the results are quite similar.
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et al. (1986)) and an invention starts to affect the real economy since its inception (Hsu et al.
(2014)). We have the following considerations when constructing this variable. First, the selection
of countries and period of time is based on the availability of annual observations on patent
applications. Second, countries with many zeros or very small amount of patents and missing
values are not considered. Third, countries in our sample are expected to exhibit different stages
of development.
We also use the number of utility models as another measure of innovation. This indicator is
obtained from WIPO. The major differences between patents and utility models are as follows.
First, the requirements for acquiring a utility model are less stringent than for patents. Second,
utility models are cheaper to obtain and to maintain. Third, the term of protection for utility
models is shorter than for patents. Therefore, in many countries, utility models are sometimes
referred to as “second-class patents”. Thus, patents and utility models represent different quality
of innovation.6 Throughout this paper, patents are used as the primary indicator of innovation
in the regressions. However, we provide the estimation results for utility models in the dynamic
threshold regression as an additional robustness check. The last indicator of innovation we use as a
robustness check is R&D expenditure (%GDP)7, which is collected from OECD and UNESCO. We
drop four countries due to missing values, reducing our sample reduces to 46 countries. However,
our threshold estimations remain robust even with the reduced sample size.
For controls in innovation regression, we include net inflow of foreign direct investment (%GDP)
measuring the technology diffusion effect; population, which accounts for possible scale effects in
the process of innovation; mean years of schooling; GDP per capita; and protection for intellectual
property right. Regarding the growth regression, the dependent variable is the growth rate of
GDP per capita and the variables of interest are innovation and financial development. We
consider innovation as regime dependent variable and take financial development as the threshold
variable. The controls include general government final consumption (%GDP), capital formation
(%GDP), CPI-based inflation rate (%), trade openness (%GDP), mean years of schooling, and
initial GDP per capita. To remove the influence of cyclical components of data, we use five years
non-overlapping averages. The final panel consists of 50 countries from 1990 to 2016, among
which, 28 are high income countries and the rest are upper and lower middle income countries.
Table A7 provides the definition, construction and source of each variable. Summary statistics
are shown in Table indicating a significant heterogeneity in innovation and financial development
across countries.
[Place Table 1 about here]
6This strategy can also be seen at Cai et al. (2018)
7Some studies think that R&D indicator does not capture innovation very well because it belongs to input and
provides insufficient information on the output of R&D activities. Despite this, we think R&D indicator is still
useful as an alternative indicator to check the robustness of our results because it retains some predictive power
about the innovative output.
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3 Results
As a starting point, we build an intuition about the relationship between financial development
and innovation by qualitatively splitting the sample into two groups: high financial development
countries and low financial development countries. Specifically, the countries are ranked by the
level of financial development in an ascending order. Then we define the top half of the sample
as countries with high level of financial development, while the other half is defined as countries
with low level of financial development. Figure 1 shows that as financial development continues to
expand, its effect on innovation tends to decrease. This illustration seems to match the prediction
of existing theories, but possible non-linearities might exist via other sources. Next, we present
the empirical results.
[Place Figure 1 about here]
3.1 Results for linear system-GMM
3.1.1 Financial development and innovation
Table 2 reports the basic results for equation (1). In this table, we use private credit as a proxy for
financial development and the percentage change in patent application as dependent variable. We
implement a two step system-GMM estimation for equation (1). Due to the downward bias in the
computed standard errors of two-step estimation, the Windmeijer correction is applied. In each
regression, we take population as an exogenous variable, while considering the rest as endogenous
variables. The full sample results show that the overall effect of private credit on innovation is
positive and significant. Population, FDI and GDP/capita exhibit a non-negative but insignificant
effect on innovation. In addition, schooling and protection for intellectual property right have a
negative but insignificant effect.
Next, we consider the effect of private credit change as the level of financial development
increases. We find that the effect of private credit on innovation for middle income countries is
higher than that of high income countries and that the overall effect lies between 0.183 and 0.394.
Moving to the low and high financial development countries, we find a similar pattern that the
effect in low financial development countries is greater than that of high financial development
countries. Again, the overall effect lies between the two estimated effects. The p-value of the AR(2)
test and Hansen J-test are reported at the bottom of Table 2. The AR(2) test show no significant
correlation between the error term and the lagged dependent variable, which indicates that the
use of two lags for the dependent variable serve as valid instruments. The Hansen test shows that
the specifications do not suffer from over-identification issues. This exercise is consistent with the
intuition in Figure 1 and confirms our hypothesis that “too much finance” would hurt innovative
activities. In Table A1 of appendix, we provide robustness checks for regression (1) using other
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indicators of financial development and we find a similar pattern as in Table 2.
[Place Table 2 about here]
3.1.2 Financial development, innovation, and growth
This part studies how financial development affects the innovation-growth relationship. Results in
Tables 2 and A1 show that innovation may be regime dependent upon the level of financial devel-
opment, since innovation is a determinant factor for long-run growth, it is possible that the effect
of innovation on growth is conditional on the level of financial development. Our hypothesis is that
higher level of financial development hurts innovation and related investment in complementary
inventions and structure, reducing its effect on growth. We estimate equation (3) under: i) full
sample; ii) middle and high income groups; and iii) high and low level of financial development
groups. Table 3 provides the results using private credit by banks and other financial institutions
(%GDP) as a proxy for financial development (similar to Table 2), and patent per 100 billion
USD as an indicator of innovation. Table 3 shows that the overall effect of patent on growth is
positive and significant. When we split the sample into middle and high income countries, the
effect of innovation for middle income countries is larger than that of high income countries. The
same pattern appears when we split the sample into low and high level of financial development
countries. The effect is positive and significant for low financial development countries, while it is
positive and non-significant for high financial development countries. Also notice that the overall
effect lies between the effects of the two subgroups.
In terms of the coefficients of other covariates, government consumption affects negatively eco-
nomic growth, which is consistent with the related literature. High income and high financial
development countries benefit from international trade, while middle income and low financial de-
velopment countries do not. Developing countries are featured with unsound laws and regulations,
less efficient financial market and low level of human capital. These may impede its capacity to
attract foreign investment and to absorb the frontier technologies. Moreover, the negative coeffi-
cient of initial GDP per capital captures the convergence effect. Table 3 also reports AR(2) and
Hansen J-test indicating valid specifications. We further check the robustness of our estimations
using alternative indicators of financial development and we find that the results reported in Table
3 remain valid (see Table A2 in the appendix).
[Place Table 3 about here]
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3.1.3 Interaction analysis
The results in the previous sub-sections deliver a signal that the effect of innovation on growth
may be heterogeneous across countries. Based on this observation, we extend equation (2) to:
yit = ρyit−1 + αiinnovationit + γZit + ui + τt + eit (6)
where the parameter αi is country specific parameter and depends on financial development
αi = α + βFDit (7)
As discussed in introduction, countries with higher level of financial development may hurt inno-
vation and its effect on growth. We therefore expect a negative sign on β. Combining equations
(6) and (7) we can get the form of equation (3).
Table 4 reports the results of the interaction analysis. For every indicator of financial devel-
opment we find consistent results that the coefficient on interaction term is negative and that the
effect of patent is positive and significant. The average marginal effect of patent on growth is
α+β ∗FDit, since α > 0 and β < 0 the overall effect of patent is a decreasing function of financial
development. In Figure A2 in the appendix we simulate the average marginal effect of patent
on growth for all the indicators of financial development. Our findings suggest that the marginal
effect is a downward trend line and mainly positive. This is consistent with the results reported
in Table 3.
[Place Table 4 about here]
3.1.4 Credit expansion, Banking crisis, Innovation, and Growth
A number of recent empirical studies have documented a “too much finance” pattern using both
aggregrate and industrial level data. Major explanations to this evidence include credit expansion,
induced financial instability and economic volatility (Rajan (2006), De la Torre et al. (2011)), as
well as misallocation of resources (Tobin (1984), Cecchetti et al. (2015)). We find that, in our
sample, banking crisis follows closely the credit expansions. Figure A1 in the appendix shows the
evolution of private credit for U.S., UK, Japan, Malaysia, and China. For each country, a banking
crisis takes place when credit tends to expand. For example, Malaysia experienced a banking
crisis between 1997-1998. During this period the private credit level is at the highest level in our
sample. Table 5 shows the difference in financial development between crisis and tranquil period.
On average, the level of private credit is significantly higher than in tranquil period. Banking
crisis may affect innovation performance and investments via several mechanisms (Döner (2017),
OECD (2012)). For example, a crisis causes a reduction in the demand for products dampening
the incentives to innovate. In addition, firms may suffer from credit constraints and difficulties
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in accessing financing during banking crisis causing a reduction in riskier activities such as R&D
expenditurers. This pro-cyclical pattern of R&D and innovation has been observed over various
business cycles and for a variety of countries (e.g. Comin and Gertler (2006), Francois and Lloyd-
Ellis (2008)).
The “diminishing effect” documented in Tables 3 and 4 may be attributable to the potential
negative effect of banking crisis on innovation. Therefore, we consider the interaction between
innovation and banking crisis in the following equation:
yit = ρyit−1 + αinnovationit + βBCit + δinnovationit ×BCit + γZit + ui + τt + eit (8)
where BCit is the dummy for banking crisis for country i at year t. The value of this dummy is 1
if there is a banking crisis at year t and 0 for tranquil periods. δ measures the difference effect of
finance on innovation between crisis and tranquil period. Arcand et al. (2015) show that economic
volatility does not play a major role in the vanishing effect of financial development. Thus, we
expect that banking crisis does not impose a significant impact on innovation-growth nexus. The
results in Table 6 show that banking crisis and patent have the expected signs. Regarding the
interaction term, we do not find a significant negative effect which means that the vanishing effect
of innovation on growth is not a result of banking crisis.
[Place Tables 5 and 6 about here]
3.1.5 The European sovereign debt crisis and long run impact of financial crisis since
2009
The 2007-2008 financial crisis may have a long term negative impact on innovative activities and
innovation-led growth. The potential long-term negative effects on innovation and growth, if any,
can transmit through the negative effects on human capital, future investment on R&D activities,
technological leadership and public support systems for innovation (OECD (2012)).
In order to assess the heterogeneous impact of post financial crisis on innovation for different
types of countries, we divide our sample into four groups: high income countries, middle income
countries, countries with high quality of governance and countries with low quality of governance.
We consider the quality of governance because the potential negative effect on innovation may
depend on the soundness of the quality of governance.8 We use the index of quality of governance
(QOG), proposed by Teorell et al. (2018), to measure the quality of government. A country is
8The literature on the effect of Basel Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision (BCP) show that better
supervisory governance and supervisory unification were generating a positive impact on financial sector stability
and banking soundness pre-2008 financial crisis. However, these conclusions do not hold when the period examined
covers the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Quintyn et al. (2011) find a negative relationship between supervisory gover-
nance and economic resilience using a panel of 100 countries. Countries with a solid supervisory governance system
hurt more during the 2007-2008 crisis. If this evidence is reliable, then one possible explanation is that innovation
recovers slowly or is unable to return to pre-crisis level for countries with high quality of governance.
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considered as high QOG if the index is above the 50th percentile of all countries.
Panel A of Table 7 provides a brief summary of the innovation resilience after the 2007-2008
financial crisis. To assess how financial crisis affects the innovation in the long run, we construct
three indicators to measure the innovation recovery after the financial crisis. The first indicator
is called Sinking Ratio, which is defined as the ratio of countries whose innovation level does not
recover to its pre-crisis level through the whole post financial crisis period examined in our sample.
We use the average level of innovation in year 2005 and 2006 as the pre-crisis level of innovation.
Meanwhile, year 2009 is set as the initial year after the financial crisis. The sinking ratio shows
that 39.2% of high income countries never recover to its pre-crisis level of innovation between
2009-2016. Similarly, 38.4% of high QOG countries do not fully recover to its pre-crisis level of in-
novation. However, the sinking ratio is lower for middle income and low QOG countries. Next, we
consider how long does it take for a country to recover from crisis. The average years of recovery is
defined as the average years needed to return to pre-crisis level for those recovered countries. We
find that middle income and low QOG countries take longer to recover to pre-crisis level than that
of high income and high QOG countries. The average years needed to recover for high income and
high QOG countries is between 0.43 and 0.5, however, this time is around 1.4 for middle income
and low QOG countries. We also take a look at the years needed for the first positive growth of
innovation after crisis, which is defined as the average years of first turning point. We find that for
each of the four groups, countries tend to recover in a quarter after 2009. Overall, middle income
and low QOG countries take longer to recover to pre-crisis innovation level, but the sinking ratio
is lower than that of high income and high QOG countries. This indicates that the self-healing
ability after crisis in middle income and low QOG countries is stronger. These facts are consistent
with the pattern in Quintyn et al. (2011).
The financial crisis may have a significant role on the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis
(ESDC) started in late 2009 and early 2010 through international financial linkages, but ESDC
should not be simply taken as the consequence of the recent financial crisis. Many factors con-
tribute to the ESDC.9 In our sample, there are 17 European countries, which are among the high
income countries. Although 12 out of 17 countries tend to recover to its pre-crisis level of inno-
vation very quickly, most of these European countries are affected during the ESDC. To measure
how ESDC may affect countries’ innovation after 2010,10 we construct a simple indicator measur-
ing the ratio of countries with negative average growth rate of innovation since 2010. As shown
in row 4 of panel A in Table 7, 67.86% of high income countries experience negative growth of
9For example, the globalization of finance; easy credit conditions during 2002-2008 period that encouraged high-
risk lending and borrowing practices; international trade imbalance; the inaccordance between unified Euro Zone
monetary policy and independent fiscal policy of individual sovereign country; and possibly the inability of the
macroeconomic model employed by European Central Bank
10Notice that, we cannot attribute a country’s declination of innovation after 2010 simply to the impact of ESDC,
for example, we find that Argentina and Brazil show a negative trend. This, however, could be a compound effect
of both long-run effect of financial crisis and other domestic factors.
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innovation, while this figure is 50% for middle income countries. For high QOG countries, 69.23%
of them show negative growth rate of innovation. This indicator is 50% for low QOG countries.
Regarding the European countries in our sample, 14 out of 17 show a negative trend in innovation
during this course. Over the same period, the level of financial development, as shown in panel B
of Table 7, is higher for high income and high QOG countries.
Table 8 provides a test on the impact of post financial crisis and ongoing European sovereign
debt crisis on innovation. We define the dummy LC = 1 for the years after 2009 and LC = 0
if otherwise. The interaction term between financial development and LC is negative. This indi-
cates that the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis and post financial crisis impose a significant
negative effect on innovation.
Combining these facts, it is possible that the diminishing effect of finance on innovation-led
growth is caused by the ongoing ESDC and long run negative effect of financial crisis. To check
the robustness of our results, we delete the sample after 2010 to rule out the influence of post
financial crisis and European Debt Crisis. The results in Table 9 use private credit as indicator
of financial development11 and show that the pattern is quite similar to that of the full sample.
In the growth regression, the overall effect of patent is positive and higher for middle income and
low level of financial development countries. This shows that the non-linearity between finance,
innovation and growth is robust and independent of the financial crisis and European sovereign
debt crisis.
[Place Tables 7, 8, and 9 about here]
3.1.6 Brief summary
The results illustrated in this sub-section reveal the existence of possible non-linearity between
financial development, innovation and growth. Countries with higher level of financial develop-
ment tend to have a lower rate of innovation and growth. The results are robust under a series
of robustness checks. However, in the above analysis we slpit our sample using qualitative char-
acteristics and the threshold at which the non-linearity occurs is not rigorously estimated. To
quantitatively measure whether there is a threshold for the finance-innovation-growth nexus, we
use a dynamic panel threshold methodology developed by Seo and Shin (2016).
3.2 Dynamic Panel Threshold Result
Seo and Shin (2016)’s model extends Hansen (1999) and Caner and Hansen (2004) static panel
threshold model and Kremer et al. (2013) dynamic panel threshold model by allowing for the
transitional variable and other covariates to be endogenous and for unobserved individual hetero-
geneity. To estimate the coefficients they propose a First Difference GMM (FD-GMM) transfor-
11We also use other indicators of financial development for robustness check, and the results are similar.
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mation. This algorithm relaxes the exogeneity assumption of regressors and threshold variable
and guarantees that the estimators follow normal distribution asymptotically, which validates the
use of Wald test for standard statistical inference on threshold and other parameters. The GMM
estimators are obtained through a two-step procedure.12
3.2.1 Innovation regression
In innovation regression, equation (4), we consider financial development as a threshold vari-
able as well as a regime dependent variable. Financial development could be endogenous due to
omitted variables and due to the reverse causality between technological progress and financial
services. Technology changes relating to telecommunications and data processing have greatly
spurred financial innovations and services in commercial banking that have facilitated secondary
markets for retail loans, such as credit card debt and mortgages. For example, the introduction
of Automated Teller Machines (ATMs), Debit Cards, Online Banking and Prepaid Cards have
significantly enhanced the banking account access and amount of credits (Frame et al. (2014)). It
is hence necessary to take the endogeneity issue of financial development into account. Previous
panel threshold methods cannot handle the endogeneity issue of the threshold variable and other
covariates. Seo and Shin (2016)’s model construct the set of instrumental variables using the
lagged dependent variable, the threshold variable and other covariates.
Table 10 shows the results for every indicator of financial development using dynamic panel
threshold method. For private credit in column (1), the effect of FD is positive and significant
in the lower regime, while it becomes insignificant in the upper regime. The estimated threshold
value of banking credit is 48% and the linearity test indicates an overall significant non-linear re-
lationship. In addition, the over-identification test (J-test) indicates no over-identification issues.
Moving from column (2) to (4), we find consistent results with that of private credit and with
estimated threshold values at around 50%.
[Place Table 10 about here]
3.2.2 Growth regression
In growth regression, equation (5), we consider the financial development as the threshold variable
and innovation as the regime dependent variable. The endogeneity role of financial development in
the finance-growth relationship is undetermined. Evidences from country cross-section, time series
and panel data studies provide mixed signals on the causality between financial development and
growth. Using cross sectional data, King and Levine (1993a), Levine et al. (2000) and Levine et al.
(2003) show evidence of one-way causation, that financial development leads to growth. Subse-
quent studies cast doubts on the cross-section country evidences. Cross-sectional data may cause
12For details see Seo and Shin (2016)
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spurious correlation arising from nonstationarity. To overcome this potential issue, Demetriades
and Hussein (1996) use time series data for 16 countries and conduct cointegration test, they find
evidence of bi-directionality and even evidence of reverse causality. Also, they find that the causal
relationship between financial development and growth is country-specific. However, time series
evidence may also be unreliable due to the short time span of data. A good option may be the use
of panel data. Using panel data for ten developing countries Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004)
apply a panel cointegration analysis and find evidence in support of the cross-section country
studies. Calderón and Liu (2003) use a panel of 105 countries from 1960 to 1994 and find that, in
general, financial development leads to growth. However, the effect is heterogeneous across coun-
tries and larger in developing countries. Moreover, they find that Granger causality test shows a
bi-directional causality between financial development and growth.
In sum, the above evidence reveal the possibility of reverse causality between financial devel-
opment and growth. This leads us to consider the threshold variable (the indicator of financial
development) as endogenous. Regarding the endogeneity issue of other covariates, innovation may
also be endogenously determined by economic development. High income countries typically invest
more in R&D activities and hence promote innovation. Government spending, trade, inflation,
schooling and investment may also be endogenous due to reverse causality and omitted variable
issues. To account for the endogeneity issues, we use the lagged threshold variable, regime depen-
dent variable, dependent variable and other covariates as instruments.
Table 11 summarizes the basic results of the dynamic panel threshold regression for every
financial development indicator, estimating equation (5). Column 1 shows the results from the
use of private credit as financial development indicator. The coefficient of patent is positive and
significant for the lower regime, while it is negative at the upper regime. The estimated threshold
value is 58.4% of GDP. The p-value of the linearity test shows a significant non-linearity between
the two regimes. Using alternative indicators of financial development, we obtain similar results,
except for liquidity. Specifically, banking credit and domestic credit generate a threshold value
of 58.5% and 57.7%, respectively. However, for liquidity liability both lower and upper regime
show negative effect, while the estimated threshold is 136.7%. One possible reason for the high
estimated threshold value for liquidity liability is that the tail of liquidity density is longer than
the others. The Kernel density of the four indicators are plotted in Figure A3 in the appendix.
Obviously, the density of liquidity liability is significantly right-skewed, which may explain the
relatively larger threshold value.
[Place Table 11 about here]
3.2.3 Robustness checks
As a robustness check we re-examine our threshold estimations taking into account the R&D
spending as an alternative indicator of innovation. Tables A3 and A4 report the innovation and
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growth threshold estimations, respectively. The results indicate that the key non-linear relation-
ship and estimated threshold values, reported in the previous subsections, remain consistent.
We also provide an additional robustness check taking into account the utility models, as an
additional indicator of innovation. In this case we re-estimate the results for the growth threshold
equation (see Table A5) and we find that the estimated threshold remains around the level of
60% as a share of GDP, which is consistent with the results we obtained using patents (see Table
11) and the results we obtained using R&D spending (see Table A4). Therefore, these robustness
checks indicate the validity and consistency of our baseline results.
3.2.4 Discussion
Most of the estimated threshold values in finance-growth literature are between 53% and 100%. For
example Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) and Arcand et al. (2015) estimate a threshold of around
100%, Masten et al. (2008) between 53% and 70%, Law and Singh (2014) at 88%, and Samargandi
et al. (2015) at 91%. In our sample, the estimated threshold values are at about 60%. While this
value is towards the smaller value of the range reported in the related literature, we argue that
this is not due to the sample selection issue, rather the econometric method employed and the
potential impact of financial integration across Europe and the world. As a comparision, we apply
the quadratic regression by including the square term of financial development indicators and the
Kremer et al. (2013)’s panel threshold model to our current sample. To find out the optimal value,
the quadratic regression use Lind and Mehlum U-shape test to decide whether the nonlinear effect
exists or not and where the threshold value lies. All the quadratic regressions are estimated using
system-GMM. Kremer et al. (2013)’s panel threshold model includes lagged dependent variable as
the only instrument variable, without taking into account the endogeneity of threshold variable,
regime dependent variable, and other covariates. The results in table A6 show that both methods
give very large threshold values, which is consistent with the threshold documented in previous
studies. In this sense, the large threshold value documented in previous studies may be biased.
In addition, our sample contains 17 European countries from 1990 to 2016. Therefore, our
threshold value cannot be completely attributed to the differences in the econometric tools, but it
also relates to financial integration across European countries and the rest of the world. Financial
integration may enhance the positive effect of financial development on innovation and growth,
thus may lead to a smaller threshold value of financial development. One direct evidence is from
Masten et al. (2008), where using data from European countries they document a credit-to-GDP
threshold between 53-70%, which is similar to our work.
In Table 12 we provide an additional test by re-estimating equation (5) considering the financial
development as both the threshold variable and the regime dependent variable. This way we test
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the threshold effect between finance and growth. Therefore, equation (5) becomes:
yit = ρyit−1 + βLFDit ∗ I(FDit ≤ γ) + βHFDit ∗ I(FDit > γ) + θZit + ui + τt + eit (9)
The results indicate an estimated threshold value of about 60%, which is very close with the
results from the previous sub-section presented in Tables 11 and A3. This shows that the results
we obtained in the previous sub-section, where we allowed for innovation to switch according to
the financial indicator, remain valid even if we do not consider innovation as a regime dependent
variable. Therefore, innovation does not affect significantly the estimated threshold of financial
development, but it seems to be significantly affected by the level of financial development.
[Place Table 12 about here]
3.2.5 Theoretical explanation
Evidences in Tables 10, 11, and 12 reveal two important economic implications. First, we show that
financial development imposes diminishing effect on rate of innovation, such a diminishing effect
may slow down economic growth. In this sense, our findings provide a channel through which “too
much finance” may harm growth. There may exist three channels through which this diminishing
effect works. First, financial development reduces the rate of innovation and thus the productivity
growth. In Rajan and Zingales (1998), they show that financial development causes the productiv-
ity growth in a unidirectional way. Levine et al. (1998) also shows that productivity growth is the
main channel linking financial development to growth. These studies indicate productivity growth
as a major channel through which financial development affects growth. Therefore, the negative
effect of financial development on growth may be attributed to its potential negative effect on
productivity growth. Follow this logic, Aghion et al. (2018) has documented an inverted U-shaped
relationship between financial development and productivity growth. We show explicitly that the
diminishing effect of financial development on rate of innovation could be the source of inverted
U-shape relationship between financial development and productivity growth. In this sense, we
close the FD-innovation-productivity-growth chain. Second, FD may reduce both the quantity and
quality of innovation. This also causes a decline in productivity growth and aggregate growth.
Finally, high level of financial development induces volatility in firm sales growth (Wang and Wen
(2009)), signalling a downward expectation on the returns of investment. This may reduce the
investment in risky projects such as R&D activities. Lower R&D expenditure may slow down the
rate of innovation output, and thus the innovation-led growth.
The second implication is that financial development may make innovations less effective in
promoting economic growth. In other words, given a unit increase in innovation, the contribution
of innovation is smaller in countries with higher level of financial development. Why? We think
that an innovation will not be effective in promoting productivity and aggregate growth until
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necessary complementary inventions and follow-up investment in productive capital occurs. As
credit market develops, bank and firm develop close ties. This close firm-bank ties may facilitate
firms to access credit, but it may also prevent firms from involving risky projects such as R&D
activities (Weinstein and Yafeh (1998)), causing less productive but more pledgeable projects to be
easily financed (Cecchetti et al. (2015)). The results in table A3 also confirm this argument. The
relatively less investment of productive capital may prolong the implementation and restructuring
lags and reduce the contribution of innovation on productivity and economic growth (Gordon
(2018)).
4 Conclusion
This paper has empirically tested the hypothesis that an expansion in financial sector would hurt
innovation and innovation-led growth, using a panel of 50 countries over 1990-2016. The results
from a linear system-GMM shows that countries with higher level of financial development are
associated with a relatively low rate of innovation. Furthermore, this vanishing effect between
finance and innovation would finally transmit to innovation-led growth. We find that the positive
effect of innovation on growth is smaller or even insignificant for countries with developed finan-
cial sector. These conclusions are robust to the banking crisis, the long run effect of 2007-2008
financial crisis, the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis and alternative indicators of financial
development and innovation. To precisely estimate the threshold value at which the vanishing
effect starts, a dynamic panel threshold model is employed. We find that, for our sample of coun-
tries, innovation starts to have an insignificant effect on output growth when private credit reaches
the level of around 60% of GDP. Finally, we have shown that our threshold value is not driven
by our sample size and selection but the difference in the tools employed in our work, compared
to the related literature, as well as the ongoing regional and international financial integration
process.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Innovation regression
Patent 5.351 5.353 1.726 1.075 9.169 300
Utility models 3.808 3.747 2.273 -1.531 7.985 294
R&D 1.266 0.892 1.054 0.05 4.26 276
FDI 0.048 0.021 0.169 -0.04 2.691 300
GDP/capita 9.773 9.946 0.851 7.502 11.311 300
Population 17.003 17.096 1.651 12.471 21.039 300
Schooling 8.906 9.06 2.654 2.42 13.4 300
IP 3.435 3.68 1.051 0.2 4.875 300
Growth regression
Growth rate 0.023 0.019 0.025 -0.045 0.244 300
Govt 0.163 0.164 0.05 0.055 0.3 300
Trade 0.754 0.601 0.587 0.156 4.109 300
Investment 0.237 0.228 0.058 0.098 0.474 300
Inflation 0.195 0.032 1.365 -0.017 16.672 300
Initial GDP/capita 9.496 9.509 0.877 7.502 10.755 300
Indicators of Financial Development
Private credit 0.742 0.685 0.479 0.079 2.223 300
Banking credit 0.674 0.567 0.439 0.066 2.223 300
Domestic credit 0.756 0.651 0.495 0.115 2.359 300
Liquidity 0.690 0.602 0.392 0.137 2.126 300
Banking crisis 0.23 0 0.422 0 1 300
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Figure 1: Financial development and innovation
Note: Countries are sorted according to the level of financial development(FD). This figure splits the countries into
two groups: low FD countries and high FD countries. Each group contains 25 countries. This figure uses patent
as proxy for innovation.
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Table 2: Financial development and Innovation: 1990-2016
Dependent var: Percentage change in patents
Full MIC HIC LFD HFD
L.Patent 0.024 -0.258∗ 0.006 -0.273∗∗∗ -0.021
(0.073) (0.145) (0.049) (0.088) (0.064)
Private credit 0.353∗ 0.394∗∗ 0.183 0.837∗∗ 0.229
(0.181) (0.194) (0.158) (0.401) (0.153)
FDI 0.086 9.877 0.139∗∗∗ -0.975 -0.118
(0.082) (10.310) (0.048) (1.229) (0.344)
Population 0.019 0.161∗∗∗ 0.033 0.121∗∗ 0.004
(0.048) (0.060) (0.022) (0.060) (0.029)
GDP/capita 0.191 -0.275 0.194 0.452 0.109
(0.336) (0.553) (0.251) (0.347) (0.249)
Schooling -0.115∗∗ 0.080 -0.089∗∗∗ 0.015 -0.072
(0.046) (0.121) (0.027) (0.064) (0.054)
IP -0.039 -0.064 -0.092 -0.020 0.072
(0.133) (0.181) (0.074) (0.137) (0.121)
Obs 250 110 140 125 125
Countries 50 22 28 25 25
AR(2) test 0.130 0.232 0.392 0.250 0.215
Hansen J test 0.240 0.859 0.365 0.505 0.483
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are five years average
values; Windmeijer correction method is applied for each regression; MIC: Middle
income countries; HIC: High income countries; LFD: Low financial development
countries; HFD: High financial development countries. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
27
Table 3: Financial development, Innovation, and Growth: 1990-2016
Dependent var: Growth of GDP per capita
Full MIC HIC LFD HFD
L.Growth 0.170 -0.119 -0.246∗∗ 0.041 0.097
(0.366) (0.189) (0.098) (0.381) (0.183)
Patent 0.004∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.002 0.008∗∗ 0.001
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Govt -0.070 -0.262∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.122∗ -0.001
(0.043) (0.082) (0.042) (0.067) (0.046)
Trade 0.004∗ 0.004 0.006∗∗ 0.006 0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.010) (0.003) (0.010) (0.002)
Investment -0.029 -0.012 0.309∗∗∗ 0.057 0.153∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.117) (0.109) (0.075) (0.058)
Inflation -0.012 -0.001 0.005 -0.006 -0.120
(0.019) (0.032) (0.052) (0.029) (0.166)
Schooling 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Initial -0.009∗∗ -0.011 -0.023∗∗ -0.009 -0.013∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004)
Obs 250 110 140 125 125
Countries 50 22 28 25 25
AR(2) test 0.236 0.120 0.145 0.152 0.433
Hansen J test 0.187 0.667 0.148 0.357 0.126
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All variables are five years average values;
Windmeijer correction method applied for each regression; MIC: Middle income
countries; HIC: High income countries; LFD: Low financial development coun-
tries; HFD: High financial development countries. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Table 4: The effect of innovation on growth with level of financial development:1990-2016
Dependent var: Growth rate of GDP per capita
Private credit Banking credit Domestic credit Liquidity
L.Growth -0.009 0.026 -0.001 -0.011
(0.113) (0.287) (0.104) (0.153)
Patent 0.012∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
FD*Patent -0.006∗∗ -0.006∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.005∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Govt -0.066 -0.028 -0.095∗ -0.056
(0.051) (0.057) (0.050) (0.042)
Trade 0.005 0.009∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Investment 0.096 0.078 0.092 0.116
(0.067) (0.067) (0.061) (0.082)
Inflation -0.075 -0.056 -0.072 -0.056
(0.063) (0.055) (0.059) (0.042)
Schooling 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Initial -0.007∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Obs 250 250 250 250
Countries 50 50 50 50
AR(2) test 0.152 0.173 0.172 0.119
Hansen J test 0.918 0.769 0.956 0.598
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All variables are five years average values; Windmeijer correction
method is applied for each regression; FD is the indicators of financial development, it includes Banking
credit, private credit, liquidity liability, and domestic credit. FD*Patent is the interaction between
financial development and patent. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Financial development in crisis and tranquil period
Vars Ave. (BC=1) Ave. (BC=0) diff standard error t-statistics p-value
PC1 0.90 0.67 -0.23∗∗∗ 0.056 -4.019 0.000
PC2 0.83 0.61 -0.22∗∗∗ 0.052 -4.217 0.000
LL 0.75 0.64 -0.11∗∗ 0.045 -2.204 0.027
DC 0.92 0.71 -0.21∗∗∗ 0.041 -5.037 0.000
Notes: PC1 refers to private credit by banks and other financial institutions(%GDP); PC2 refers to
private credit by deposite money banks(%GDP); LL is liquidity liability(%GDP). DC is domestic private
credit(%GDP). BC is short for banking crisis, it equals to 1 if there is banking crisis event in that year,
and 0 if otherwise. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 6: Banking crisis, innovation, and growth:1990-2016
Dependent var: Growth rate
(1) (2) (3)
L.Growth 0.520 0.363 0.087
(0.368) (0.283) (0.201)
Patent 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
BC -0.002 -0.010 0.000
(0.031) (0.032) (0.030)
BC*Patent -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Initial -0.012∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Govt -0.048 -0.070∗
(0.033) (0.041)
Trade 0.005∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Schooling -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Investment -0.041
(0.066)
Inflation 0.006
(0.030)
Obs 250 250 250
Countries 50 50 50
AR(2) test 0.618 0.538 0.115
Hansen J test 0.532 0.603 0.152
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All variables are five
years average values; Windmeijer correction method is ap-
plied for each regression; BC is short for banking crisis, it
equals to 1 if there is banking crisis event in that year, and 0
if otherwise. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 7: Impact of financial crisis and European debt crisis on innovation recovery:2009-2016
High income Middle income High QOG Low QOG
Panel A: Innovation resilience post 2007-2008 financial crisis
Sinking ratio 39.2% 22.7% 38.4% 25%
Ave. years to recover 0.50 1.43 0.43 1.39
Ave. years of first turning point 0.34 0.33 0.28 0.24
Ratio of negative growth since 2010 67.86% 50% 69.23% 50%
Panel B: Financial development since 2010(mean values)
Banking credit 94.31% 39.47% 101.93% 39.23%
Private credit 102% 44.05% 112.91% 43.79%
Liquidity 89.18% 52% 92.26% 51.99%
Domestic credit 99.26% 45.71% 112.39% 44.71%
Note: Financial crisis between 2007 and 2008. Take year 2009 as the initial year post crisis. Sinking ratio is defined as the
ratio of countries whose innovation level do not recover back to its pre-crisis level through the period examined in our sample;
Average years to recover refers to the average years needed to return back to pre-crisis level for those recovery countries;
Average years of first turning point calculates the average years needed for the first positive growth of innovation
post crisis. Ratio of negative growth since 2010 measures the ratio of countries with negative average growth rate of
innovation since 2010. Pre-crisis innovation level are calculated as the average innovation level of 2005 and 2006.
Table 8: The impact of post financial crisis and european sovereign debt crisis on innovation
Dependent var: Growth of patent
Private credit Banking credit Domestic credit Liquidity
L.Patent -0.116 -0.122 -0.122 -0.028
(0.100) (0.109) (0.098) (0.055)
LC 0.133 0.104 0.093 0.126
(0.144) (0.140) (0.122) (0.111)
FD 0.472∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.187
(0.129) (0.114) (0.143) (0.186)
LC*FD -0.266∗∗ -0.271∗∗ -0.200∗ -0.254∗∗
(0.135) (0.133) (0.111) (0.126)
FDI 0.305 0.365 0.309 -0.386
(0.427) (0.418) (0.421) (0.573)
Population 0.066 0.088 0.066 0.032
(0.075) (0.080) (0.082) (0.066)
GDP/capita 0.374 0.395 0.412 0.146
(0.428) (0.489) (0.486) (0.372)
Schooling -0.079 -0.065 -0.082 -0.046
(0.062) (0.066) (0.065) (0.062)
IP -0.049 -0.054 -0.049 0.024
(0.090) (0.092) (0.094) (0.090)
Obs 250 250 250 250
Countries 50 50 50 50
AR(2) test 0.121 0.105 0.112 0.118
Hansen J test 0.542 0.670 0.566 0.664
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are five years average values; Windmeijer
correction method is applied for each regression; FD is the indicators of financial development, it
includes Banking credit, private credit, liquidity liability, and domestic credit. LC is a dummy equals
to 1 if after 2009, and it is 0 if otherwise. LC*FD is the interaction between financial development and
LC. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 9: Ruling out the the impact of post financial crisis and european sovereign debt crisis on
innovation: 1990-2009
Dependent var: Growth of GDP per capita
Full MIC HIC LFD HFD
L.Growth 0.188 -0.013 -0.300∗∗ -0.162 -0.081
(0.354) (0.239) (0.146) (0.141) (0.345)
Patent 0.003∗ 0.014∗∗∗ -0.006 0.005∗∗ -0.000
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Govt -0.021 -0.173 0.041 -0.040 0.079
(0.031) (0.129) (0.104) (0.061) (0.061)
Trade 0.002 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.004
(0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004)
Investment 0.092 -0.113 0.693∗ 0.035 0.265∗∗
(0.131) (0.086) (0.401) (0.103) (0.111)
Inflation -0.002 0.029 -0.027 0.003 -0.058
(0.015) (0.025) (0.088) (0.019) (0.096)
Schooling 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Initial -0.009∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.010∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004)
Obs 150 66 84 75 75
Countries 50 22 28 25 25
AR(2) test 0.236 0.089 0.242 0.106 0.221
Hansen J test 0.183 0.518 0.741 0.543 0.127
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are five years average
values; Windmeijer correction method is applied for each regression. ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 10: Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis: Innovation regression
Private credit Banking credit Domestic credit Liquidity
Threshold(γ̂) 0.480∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.044) (0.033) (0.130)
Financial development
β̂L(FD ≤ γ) 1.339∗∗∗ 1.246∗∗∗ 1.184∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗
(0.237) (0.219) (0.215) (0.176)
β̂H(FD > γ) 0.030 0.096 -0.060 -0.345
∗∗∗
(0.234) (0.218) (0.204) (0.109)
L.Patent 0.632∗∗∗ 0.596∗∗∗ 0.603∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.039) (0.029) (0.038)
FDI -0.048∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.024∗ -0.034
(0.026) (0.033) (0.010) (0.022)
Population 0.048 0.095 0.230 -0.109
(0.444) (0.327) (0.169) (0.319)
GDP/capita 0.302∗∗∗ 0.359∗ 0.069 0.486∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.097) (0.106) (0.094)
IP 0.259∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.044) (0.032) (0.038)
Schooling -0.037 -0.031 0.023∗∗∗ 0.032
(0.025) (0.025) (0.007) (0.028)
Obs 250 250 250 250
Countries 50 50 50 50
Linearity test(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 0.497 0.310 0.234 0.14
J(p-value) 0.94 0.94 0.36 0.94
Note: The null of linearity test is H0: β̂L = β̂H . m2 tests for lack of second order serial correlation in the residuals.
If this test rejects the null hypothesis, then the moment restrictions are not valid and the GMM estimator will be
inconsistent. The J test is a specification test which means that if it rejects, either the orthogonality conditions,
or other assumptions, or both are false. Robust standard errors in the parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
33
Table 11: Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis: Growth regression
Private credit Banking credit Domestic credit Liquidity
Threshold(γ̂) 0.584∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.577∗∗∗ 1.367∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.023) (0.032) (0.067)
Innovation
β̂L(FD≤γ) 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.006∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
β̂H(FD>γ) -0.008
∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
L.Growth -0.440∗∗∗ -0.479∗∗∗ -0.380∗∗∗ -0.392∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.037) (0.018) (0.031)
Schooling 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Govt -0.514∗∗∗ -0.733∗∗∗ -0.572∗∗∗ -0.936∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.072) (0.074) (0.082)
Investment 0.221∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.018) (0.013) (0.017)
Trade 0.013∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Inflation 0.004 0.005 -0.011 -0.033∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011)
Obs 250 250 250 250
Countries 50 50 50 50
Linearity test(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 0.03 0.05 0.15 0.04
J(p-value) 0.36 0.94 0.36 0.99
Note: The null of linearity test is H0: β̂L = β̂H . m2 tests for lack of second order serial correlation in the residuals.
If this test rejects the null hypothesis, then the moment restrictions are not valid and the GMM estimator will be
inconsistent. The J test is a specification test which means that if it rejects, either the orthogonality conditions,
or other assumptions, or both are false. Robust standard errors in the parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
34
Table 12: Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis: Growth regression without interaction between finance
and patent
Private credit Banking credit Domestic credit Liquidity
Threshold(γ̂) 0.591∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗ 0.611∗∗∗ 0.730∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.033) (0.025) (0.252)
Financial development
β̂L(FD≤γ) 0.034∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.086∗
(0.015) (0.008) (0.010) (0.047)
β̂H(FD>γ) -0.056
∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ 0.012
(0.015) (0.006) (0.008) (0.027)
L.Growth -0.271∗∗∗ -0.381∗∗∗ -0.312∗∗∗ -0.034
(0.027) (0.055) (0.043) (0.103)
Schooling 0.005∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.002 -0.009∗
(0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
Govt -0.004∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.001 -0.005
(0.000) (0.004) (0.026) (0.006)
Investment 0.069∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.109
(0.012) (0.014) (0.019) (0.075)
Trade -0.006 0.025∗∗∗ 0.027 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.023)
Inflation -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009)
Obs 250 250 250 250
Countries 50 50 50 50
Linearity test(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.029
J(p-value) 0.36 0.94 0.94 0.03
Note: The null of linearity test is H0: β̂L = β̂H . m2 tests for lack of second order serial correlation in the residuals.
If this test rejects the null hypothesis, then the moment restrictions are not valid and the GMM estimator will be
inconsistent. The J test is a specification test which means that if it rejects, either the orthogonality conditions,
or other assumptions, or both are false. Robust standard errors in the parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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A Appendix
Figure A1: Credit Expansion and Banking Crisis
Note: Shaded area indicates a banking crisis in that year. Original database on Banking Crisis is obtained from
Laeven and Valencia (2013), Systemic Banking Crises Database(1970-2011). The data from 2012 to 2016 are
extended by the author by searching key words that indicates a banking crisis for each country between 2012 and
2016. Key words includes bank run, bank crisis and illiquidity.
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Table A2: Robustness checks for growth regression (2): 1990-2016
Dependent var: Growth rate of GDP per capita
Banking credit Domestic credit Liquidity
LFD HFD LFD HFD LFD HFD
L.Growth -0.097 0.218 0.041 0.097 -0.135 0.080
(0.252) (0.194) (0.381) (0.183) (0.276) (0.252)
Patent 0.010∗∗∗ -0.006 0.008∗∗ 0.001 0.008∗∗ 0.003
(0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Govt -0.078 -0.010 -0.122∗ -0.001 -0.091∗ -0.037
(0.066) (0.085) (0.067) (0.046) (0.052) (0.067)
Trade 0.008 0.002 0.006 0.006∗∗∗ 0.001 0.006
(0.007) (0.003) (0.010) (0.002) (0.011) (0.004)
Investment 0.072 0.075 0.057 0.153∗∗∗ 0.089 0.156
(0.054) (0.112) (0.075) (0.058) (0.067) (0.114)
Inflation -0.019 -0.222 -0.006 -0.120 -0.026 0.113
(0.040) (0.262) (0.029) (0.166) (0.038) (0.095)
Schooling -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Initial -0.011∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.009 -0.013∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗ -0.011∗
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Obs 125 125 125 125 125 125
Countries 25 25 25 25 25 25
AR(2) test 0.154 0.413 0.152 0.433 0.127 0.239
Hansen J test 0.512 0.151 0.357 0.126 0.268 0.102
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All variables are five years average values; Wind-
meijer correction method applied for each regression; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
38
Figure A2: Average marginal effect of patent on growth
Note: This figure simulates the marginal effect of innovation with changes in the level of financial development.
The effect of innovation is assumed to be heterogeneous across countries. The lower and upper limit of interval
for each variable is assigned to its min and max value, the step width is set as 0.02. 95% of confidence interval
reported
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Figure A3: Kernel density of four indicators of financial development
Note: Estimated density of indicators of financial development using Epanechnikov kernal density
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Table A3: Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis: Innovation regression (R&D)
Dependent var: R&D (% of GDP)
Private credit Banking credit Domestic credit Liquidity
Threshold(γ̂) 0.443∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.610∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.095) (0.085) (0.156)
Financial development
β̂L(FD ≤ γ) 1.157∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗ 1.319∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗
(0.210) (0.159) (0.367) (0.092)
β̂H(FD > γ) -0.054 0.145 0.196 0.016
(0.039) (0.149) (0.352) (0.160)
L.R&D 0.398∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.055) (0.066) (0.033)
FDI -0.016 -0.274 -0.034∗ -0.001
(0.282) (0.265) (0.018) (0.026)
Population 0.171 -0.140 0.569∗ -0.254
(0.126) (0.263) (0.322) (0.226)
GDP/capita -0.012 0.164 0.029 0.127∗∗
(0.026) (0.109) (0.106) (0.065)
IP 0.036 -0.214 0.015 0.072∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.260) (0.019) (0.024)
Schooling 0.119∗∗ 0.026 0.061∗∗∗ 0.019
(0.054) (0.027) (0.017) (0.019)
Obs 230 230 230 230
Countries 46 46 46 46
Linearity test(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 0.13 0.12 0.1 0.16
J(p-value) 1 1 0.99 0.99
Note: The null of linearity test is H0: β̂L = β̂H . m2 tests for lack of second order serial correlation in the residuals.
If this test rejects the null hypothesis, then the moment restrictions are not valid and the GMM estimator will be
inconsistent. The J test is a specification test which means that if it rejects, either the orthogonality conditions,
or other assumptions, or both are false. Robust standard errors in the parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Table A4: Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis: Growth regression (R&D)
Private credit Banking credit Domestic credit Liquidity
Threshold(γ̂) 0.531∗∗∗ 0.600∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.047) (0.029) (0.010)
R&D
β̂L(FD≤γ) 0.058∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.076)
β̂H(FD>γ) -0.014
∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗ -0.007
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.076)
L.Growth -0.365∗∗∗ -0.468∗∗∗ -0.313∗∗∗ -0.375∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.041) (0.041) (0.037)
Schooling 0.0027∗∗∗ 0.0037∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0012
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Govt -0.193∗∗∗ -0.4471∗∗∗ -0.411∗∗∗ -0.494∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.092) (0.116) (0.087)
Investment 0.193∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.013) (0.022) (0.023)
Trade 0.0066 0.013∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Inflation -0.026∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.0058 -0.077∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008)
Obs 230 230 230 230
Countries 46 46 46 46
Linearity test(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 0.06 0.03 0.12 0.17
J(p-value) 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99
Note: The null of linearity test is H0: β̂L = β̂H . m2 tests for lack of second order serial correlation in the residuals.
If this test rejects the null hypothesis, then the moment restrictions are not valid and the GMM estimator will be
inconsistent. The J test is a specification test which means that if it rejects, either the orthogonality conditions,
or other assumptions, or both are false. Robust standard errors in the parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Table A5: Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis: Growth regression (Utility models)
Private credit Banking credit Domestic credit Liquidity
Threshold(γ̂) 0.592∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.986∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.027) (0.268) (0.067)
Innovation
β̂L(FD≤γ) 0.019∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.006∗ -0.023∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
β̂H(FD>γ) -0.007
∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
L.Growth -0.502∗∗∗ -0.511∗∗∗ -0.418∗∗∗ -0.301∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.037) (0.029) (0.075)
Schooling 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Govt -0.532∗∗∗ -0.710∗∗∗ -0.515∗∗∗ -0.236
(0.087) (0.079) (0.071) (0.195)
Investment 0.202∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.018) (0.022) (0.092)
Trade 0.013∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ -0.021
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.017)
Inflation 0.012∗∗ 0.011 -0.007 -0.013
(0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.010)
Obs 245 245 245 245
Countries 49 49 49 49
Linearity test(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.11
J(p-value) 0.95 0.95 0.99 0.14
Note: The null of linearity test is H0: β̂L = β̂H . m2 tests for lack of second order serial correlation in the residuals.
If this test rejects the null hypothesis, then the moment restrictions are not valid and the GMM estimator will be
inconsistent. The J test is a specification test which means that if it rejects, either the orthogonality conditions,
or other assumptions, or both are false. Robust standard errors in the parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Table A6: Threshold estimation using quadratic and Kremer et al. (2013) method: Innovation regression
Private credit Banking credit Liquidity Domestic credit
Nonlinear test using quadratic regression
L.Patent -0.092 -0.084 0.020 -0.118
(0.070) (0.074) (0.099) (0.080)
FD 1.906∗∗ 1.303∗∗ 1.407∗∗ 2.137∗∗∗
(0.855) (0.506) (0.694) (0.822)
FD2 -0.774∗ -0.513∗∗ -0.810∗ -0.939∗∗
(0.416) (0.214) (0.463) (0.418)
FDI -0.035 -0.010 0.089 -0.102
(0.084) (0.079) (0.291) (0.159)
Population 0.004 0.005 0.038 0.006
(0.054) (0.044) (0.084) (0.056)
GDP/capita 0.119 0.191 0.231 0.308
(0.220) (0.218) (0.343) (0.315)
Schooling -0.147∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗∗ -0.152∗ -0.210∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.039) (0.086) (0.063)
IP 0.123 0.157 0.125 0.232∗
(0.151) (0.163) (0.187) (0.133)
cons -0.576 -0.915 -2.502 -2.201
(2.378) (2.327) (4.007) (3.179)
Obs 250 250 250 250
Country 50 50 50 50
AR(2) test 0.140 0.137 0.116 0.132
Hansen J test 0.411 0.409 0.435 0.930
Lind and Mehlum U-shape test
dY/dFD = 0 1.231 1.268 0.868 1.137
P-value 0.065 0.022 0.062 0.028
Threshold test using Kremer et al(2013) method
Threshold estimates
γ̂ 1.378 1.333 1.649 1.660
95% CI [1.207 3.057] [1.207 1.646] [1.289 1.782] [1.219 1.717]
Impact of FD
β̂L 0.664
∗∗ 0.854∗∗ 0.326 0.341∗∗
(0.334) (0.359) (0.24) (0.147)
β̂H 0.038 0.019 -0.008 0.044
∗
(0.027) (0.026) (0.049) (0.025)
Impact of covariates
L.Patent 0.065∗∗ 0.041 0.028 0.04
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.03)
FDI 0.031 0.037 0.042 0.035
(0.067) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064)
GDP/capita -0.105∗ -0.073 -0.061 -0.085∗
(0.055) (0.053) (0.054) (0.051)
Population 0.064 0.113 0.092 0.052
(0.147) (0.152) (0.158) (0.156)
Schooling -0.045∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
IP 0.067∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015)
δ̂ -0.116 -0.151 -0.074 -0.035
(0.093) (0.088) (0.106) (0.064)
Obs 300 300 300 300
Country 50 50 50 50
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are five years average values; Wind-
meijer correction method is applied for each regression; FD is the indicators of financial develop-
ment, it includes Banking credit, private credit, liquidity liability, and domestic credit. * (p<0.1),
** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01). 44
Table A7: Variable Definitions and Sources
Variables Definition Source
Patent Resident applications per 100 billion USD GDP(2011 PPP)(by
applicant’s origin), natural log of patent
WIPO
Utility models Resident applications per 100 billion USD GDP(by applicant’s
origin), natural log of utility models
Authors’ construction
from WIPO
R&D Gross domestic spending on R&D as percentage of GDP OECD&UNESCO
FDI Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) WDI, World Bank
GDP/capita GDP per capita(2011 PPP), natural log of GDP per capita WDI, World Bank
Population Total population ages 15-64, natural log of total population WDI, World Bank
Schooling Average number of years of education received by people ages
25 and older
UN-HDI
IP Intelectual property right protection index (five years average) Park’s IP database
Growth rate GDP per capita growth (annual %) WDI, World Bank
Govt General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) WDI, World Bank
Trade Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services
measured as a share of gross domestic product(% of GDP).
WDI, World Bank
Investment Gross capital formation (% of GDP) WDI, World Bank
Inflation Inflation as measured by the annual percentage change in con-
sumer price index reflects(%)
WDI, World Bank
Initial
GDP/capita
Initial GDP per capita, natural log of GDP per capita WDI, World Bank
Private credit Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial insti-
tutions to GDP.
WBFSD, World Bank
Banking credit The financial resources provided to the private sector by domes-
tic money banks as a share of GDP.
WBFSD, World Bank
Domestic credit Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources
provided to the private sector((% of GDP)).
WBFSD, World Bank
Liquidity Ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP. Liquid liabilities are also known
as broad money, or M3.
WBFSD, World Bank
Banking crisis A dummy variable is defined as 1 if there is banking crisis in the
year, and 0 otherwise
Laeven et al.(2013)
and authors’ construc-
tion
Note: Index of protection for intellectual property right is obatained from Park (2008), the author up-
dates the data to 2015. WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization; UNESCO: United Nations Ed-
ucational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WDI: World Development Indicators; UN-HDI: United Na-
tions Human Development Index; WBFSD: World Bank Financial Structure Database. The financial de-
velopment missing data for New Zealand is filled using data from Reserve Bank of New Zealand(https:
//www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics). Banking Crisis is obtained from Laeven and Valencia (2013), Systemic
Banking Crises Database(1970-2011). The data from 2012 to 2016 are extended by the author by searching
key words that indicates a banking crisis for each country between 2012 and 2016. Key words includes bank
run, bank crisis and illiquidity.
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